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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Board of Educ. ofKiryas
Joel Village v. Grumet:
STATUTE
CREATING SCHOOL
DISTRICT
DESIGNED TO
BENEFIT A
RELIGIOUS GROUP
VIOLATES THE
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE.

In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme
Court in Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet,
114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994), held
that a New York statute creating a school district for the benefit ofa religious enclaveviolated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Although
the Court's decision upheld the
ideal ofgovernmental neutrality
toward religion, it failed to devise a workable standard for
analyzing statutes under the Establishment Clause.
The Village of Kiryas
Joel is a village designed specifically to include only the practitioners of a strict form ofJudaism. In 1989, a state statute,
1989 N. Y.Laws, ch. 748,
("Chapter 748") removed the
village from the MonroeWoodbury Central School District and established a separate
school district, drawn according to the Kiryas Joel village
lines. Because almost all children in the newly-created district attended parochial schools,
the district's primary purpose
was to provide a public specialeducation program for handicapped children.
Just a few months prior
to the district's commencement
of operations, Respondents
Grumet and Hawk and the New
York State School Boards Association challenged Chapter
748 as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Applying the three
factors established in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, known as the Lemon
test, the trial court granted sum-

mary judgment for the respondents, finding that the statute
violated the Establishment
Clause because it promoted no
secular purpose, had the effect
of advancing religion, and fostered excessive governmental
entanglement with religion. The
Appellate Division and the Court
of Appeals of New York both
affirmed and, after staying the
mandate of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In an opinion written by
Justice Souter, the Supreme
Court began its analysis by noting that the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the
United States Constitution require government neutrality toward religion. Grumet, 114
S.Ct. at 2487. The majority
maintained that because Chapter 748 delegated civic authority to a religious group, it violated the "constitutional command" of neutrality toward religion. Id The Court compared
Chapter 748 to the statute which
was invalidated in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116 (1982). In Larkin, the
Court found that a statute violated the Establishment Clause
by granting a veto power to
churches, synagogues, and
schools over liquor license applications for premises located
within 500 feet of the church,
synagogue, or school. The statute violated the neutrality requirement by conveying governmental powers to
religious bodies, while not insuring that such power would
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be used solely for secular purposes. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. at
2488 (citing Larkin, 459 U.S.
116).
Because an unusual Act
of the legislature created the
school district, the majority
found there was "reason for
concern . . . that the legislature
[would] provide equally to other religious ( and nonreligious)
groups." Id at 2491. Observing that the authority bestowed
upon the Village ofKiryas Joel
was unique, the Court determined that future communities
would have no guarantee ofjudicial review of similar state
actions, providing no way for
the Court to determine if the
government was favoring one
group over another. Id Next,
the Court carefully emphasized
that what invalidated the statute
as an unconstitutional establishment of religion was not "[t]he
fact that Chapter 748
facilitate[ d] the practice of religion." Id at 2492. Thus, the
Court recognized and rejected
the argument that Chapter 748
was merely an accommodation
of religion.
Finally, the Court determined that Chapter 748 delegated civic power to a religious
group, raising questions as to
whether religious favoritism had
been used to establish the school
district. Id at 2494. Themajority concluded that the statute
failed the neutrality test, went
beyond the permissible
accomodation of religion, and
therefore violated the Establishment Clause ofthe First Amendment. Id

A plurality of the court,
including Justices Souter,
Blackmun, Stevens, and
Ginsburg found the Larkin reasoning persuasive, notwithstanding the factual distinction:
Chapter 748 specifically delegated power to the voters in the
school district, whereas in
Larkin the power was given to
the religious group leaders. "In
light ofthe circumstances ofthis
case, this distinction turns out
to lack constitutional significance ... [and it] is one ofform,
not substance." Id. at 2488.
The plurality explained that because the State of New York
drew the lines of the district
knowing the religious enclave
would have "exclusive control
of the political subdivision" it
was essentially equivalent to the
Larkin case. Id
By divesting political
power to a religious sect, the
statute resulted in a "forbidden
'fusion of governmental and
religious functions. '"
Id at
2490 (quoting Larkin, 459U.S.
at 126). The plurality enunciated that Chapter 748 impermissibly delegated civic authority
based on religious beliefs,
evinced by three factors. First,
the legislature was aware of the
village's exclusive control ofthe
school district. Id at 2489.
Second, the creation ofa smaller school district ran contrary to
the customary practices of the
State of New York. Id at 2490.
Third, the district was created
deliberately in a special and unusual legislative Act. Id.
In a separate concurrence, JusticeBlackmun empha-
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sized that the Court should adhere to the principles enunciated in Lemon. Justice Stevens
also wrote a separate concurrence joined by Justices
Blackmun and Ginsburg. Justice Stevens insisted that Chapter 748 established, rather than
just accommodated, religion because the school district lines
were drawn to provide "official
support" to the faith. Id. at
2495. Concurring in part and in
the judgment, Justice 0' Connor
expressed the difficulty in reducing the Establishment Clause
to a single test. Justice
0' Connor stressed that a case
by case approach is necessary to
free the Court from the unitary
approach ofLemon. Id. at 24992500. The final concurrence,
written by Justice Kennedy, expressed the view that Chapter
748 should be invalidated because the legislature drew political boundaries solely on the
basis of religion.
In a vigorous dissent,
Justice Scalia, with whom Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined, criticized the
majority for concluding a facially neutral statute had been religiously motivated. The dissent
argued thatthe statute was based
not on religion, but rather on the
"cultural distinctiveness" of the
group. Id at 2510. Further, the
dissent reasoned that even if
Chapter 748 was based on religion, this would merely constitute "permissible accommodation" of religion, not establishment. Id at 2511.
In Grumet, the Supreme
Court stressed the importance

of neutrality in governmental
action toward religion by invalidating a statute designed to aid
a religious enclave. The decision signaled the Court's recog-

nition ofthe need to evolve from
the frequently criticized Lemon
test. By not developing a workable standard, the Court left little guidance to legislatures and

lower courts in determining
whether a statute passes constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause.

Ibanez v. Florida Dept
of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd of
Accountancy:

In Ibanez v. Florida

er it would mislead a consumer
into thinking that a CFP is certified by the State.
The Petitioner, Silvia
Safille Ibanez, is a practicing
attorney in Winter Haven, Florida. In addition to being a member of the Florida Bar, Ibanez is
licensed by the Respondent,
Florida Board of Accountancy
(Board), as a CP A, and is authorized to use the designation
"Certified Financial Planner"
or "CFP" by a private organization known as the Certified
Financial Planner Board of Standards (CFPBS).
The gravamen of the
Board's Gomplaint is that Ibanez
engaged in "false, deceptive,
and misleading" advertising
when she included her credentials as a CPA and a CFP in her
yellow pages listing, under the
"Attorneys" section, as well as
in her other communications
with the public. The Board
instituted an investigation, and
eventually a complaint against
Ibanez, after receiving an anonymous copy ofher yellow pages
listing. Pursuant to various sections ofthe Public Accountancy
Act, Board Rules, and the Florida Administrative Code, the

STATE BEARS
BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING
THAT TRUTHFUL
DISCLOSURE OF
CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER AND
CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANT
DESIGNATIONS IN
COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
ISACTUALLY, INHERENTLY, OR
POTENTIALLY
MISLEADING; OR
ADVANCES A SUBSTANTIAL STATE
INTEREST BY
THE LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS IF IT
DESIRES
TO RESTRICT SUCH
SPEECH.

Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994), the United States Supreme Court reiterated the
heavy burden incumbent upon
state governments attempting
to censure or limit constitutionally protected commercial
speech when it considered the
disclosure ofvalidly held designations of "Certified Public
Accountant" (CPA) and "Certified Financial Planner" (CFP),
by a person holding herself out
as an attorney, in advertising
and other communications with
the public. The Court held that
the State must demonstrate with
sufficient specificity, not mere
speculation or conjecture, that
the public would actually be
misled or harmed by the Petitioner's commercial speech, if
the State desires to restrict truthful commercial speech. The
State must also show that the
manner ofrestriction is no more
extensive than that which is necessaryto serve the State's interest. In so holding, the Court
addressed whether the CFP designation is commonly recognized and, consequently, wheth-
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